Transforming (but not transcending) the state system? On statist cosmopolitanism by Ulaş, L.
 
Transforming (but not Transcending) the State System? On Statist 
Cosmopolitanism 
Luke Ulaş* 
Philosophy and Law, Goethe University, Frankfurt 
Can states become committed and competent agents of cosmopolitan justice? The theory of 
‘statist cosmopolitanism’ argues that they can: their citizens can be turned towards a commitment 
to cosmopolitan principles and actions by moral entrepreneurs constituting a ‘cosmopolitan avant-
garde’, and can be sustained in their commitment to those principles by their pre-existing 
attachment to the state as a political community. Taking cosmopolitan principles as axiomatic, 
this paper subjects statist cosmopolitanism to critique. First, I question the scale of the 
transformation that a cosmopolitan avant-garde can engender given the complexity of the causal 
chains the avant-garde seek to elucidate, as well as the countervailing potency of the state itself 
which reinforces particularistic attitudes in its citizens. Second, I argue that even if, contra my 
preceding argument, the cosmopolitan avant-garde were to be successful, states would find it 
desirable to federally integrate in order to be better able to realise their cosmopolitan 
commitments. Such integration is compatible with statist cosmopolitanism’s motivational theory, 
even if not its institutional vision. Finally, I re-characterise the cosmopolitan avant-garde as 
agitators for the transcendence, rather than just transformation, of the state system. 
 




Cosmopolitans are often keen to emphasise that their principles do not necessitate any 
particular institutional architecture; cosmopolitanism is a moral outlook that informs the 
critique of political institutions, but is separable from any specific institutional proposal. 
Potentially, cosmopolitan principles are realisable from within the multi-state system that 
exists today, and certainly we should not think that moral cosmopolitanism entails ‘political 
cosmopolitanism’, where by the latter is often meant something like a world state (Beitz, 
1999; Tan, 2004). However, the suggestion that cosmopolitan principles are realisable from 
within the state system may just seem like wishful thinking, especially when the case is also 
often made that it is that system that is in large part responsible for the global circumstances 
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that cosmopolitanism seeks to rectify. So do we have any positive reason to believe that the 
state system offers a promising institutional setting for the realisation of cosmopolitan 
principles, and indeed a more promising setting than potential alternatives? 
The theory of statist cosmopolitanism says we do. It argues that states represent the 
most plausible agents of cosmopolitan justice,1 since they can draw upon certain hard-won 
communal and political resources that can potentially be put in the service of cosmopolitan 
ends. Key in this regard is the idea of a ‘cosmopolitan avant-garde’, who can play the role of 
instigating cosmopolitan transformations in the attitudes and behaviour of state populations, 
and ultimately the behaviour of states themselves. In what follows, I aim firstly to raise some 
doubts about the chances of success for a cosmopolitan avant-garde. Thereafter, and setting 
those doubts aside, I dissociate the idea of the cosmopolitan avant-garde from statist 
cosmopolitanism’s institutional vision. Indeed, so I assert, in the unlikely event that the 
cosmopolitan avant-garde successfully inspire a global cosmopolitan transformation, they will 
do so whilst stimulating the transcendence - and not just the transformation - of the state 
system; in a world suitably attitudinally transformed, a federal world state is in fact a more 
plausible setting for the realisation of cosmopolitan justice than a multi-state system.2  
The paper takes the following path. In the first section I briefly set out an initial case 
against the state system as an agent of cosmopolitan justice. The second section introduces 
statist cosmopolitanism as a strong challenge to the initial argument. The remaining three 
sections focus on the idea of the ‘cosmopolitan avant-garde’. I consider, in the third section, 
whether the avant-garde can be successful in encouraging the cosmopolitan self-
reinterpretation of states, and voice some scepticism. The fourth section argues that even if the 
cosmopolitan avant-garde were to be successful, movement toward a global federal order 
would be the rational consequence. Lastly, the fifth section reinterprets the cosmopolitan 
avant-garde as agitators for the usurpation of the domestic state system rather than merely its 
reinterpretation. The effect of these last two sections together is to make a case for separating 
the idea of the cosmopolitan avant-garde from the institutional vision of statist 
cosmopolitanism, and more strongly, tethering it instead to the prospect of global political 
integration.   
 
Arguments against states as agents of cosmopolitan justice 
Cosmopolitans have more often understood the state system as a contributing factor to global 
injustice than as a promising institutional environment for its resolution. At the most basic 
level, the very existence of multiple states claiming external sovereignty looks to be 
inherently anti-cosmopolitan: whilst cosmopolitanism is a universalistic theory, states are 
fundamentally particularistic entities that claim the sovereign right to discriminate between 
members and non-members. Since some states are much more powerful and richer than 
others, those who are excluded from better-off states are comparatively disadvantaged, and 
indeed are often desperately poor in absolute terms. 
 That some states are currently better off than others doesn’t in itself tell us that 
cosmopolitan justice couldn’t be realised from within the state system, of course. Yet this 
further claim is also made, and is often informed by some form of ‘realist’ theorising; rather 
than pursue cosmopolitan justice, states inevitably pursue their own interests (e.g. Kamminga, 
2006). Resultantly, more powerful states will, for example, manipulate international 
organisations, such as the WTO, in line with their own advantage (Moellendorf, 2005; 
Steinberg, 2002). Pursuit of state self-interest inevitably also leads to collective action 
problems with respect to the delivery of global public goods like the avoidance of climate 
change, the preservation of fish stocks, combating the spread of disease, international peace, 
and, so we might add, the realisation of global justice.3  
Moreover, one can question the very notion that states are appropriately chargeable 
with duties of cosmopolitan justice, even assuming that cosmopolitan principles are 
normatively defensible. After all, what is the purpose of the state? One answer to this question 
is to say that the state is a type of association, and that the best way to determine the purpose 
of an association is to ask its members what they see as its purpose. Another way of putting 
this is that the state should operate according to the will of its people. But to date the declared 
will of the people has reliably been that a state’s government should pursue the interests of its 
own citizens; the ‘national interest’. These days the ‘national interest’ is typically translated 
by politicians into a demand for economic growth; the pursuit of an ever-increasing Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP). The demand is not for globally increasing gross product (other than 
insofar as this is instrumentally beneficial for domestic gain), but for increasing GDP in this 
state. This can be understood as a concern for absolute gain, but it also by extension tends to 
involve the pursuit of relative gain, i.e. the seeking of advantage over other states. Increasing 
the GDP of one state frequently involves, for example, making exports globally competitive, 
attracting businesses that may have built plants elsewhere, and so on. It has also tended to 
involve more coercive and exploitative inter-state practices, that establish and solidify the 
power of some states over others, and that are by and large consented to, at least tacitly, by 
benefiting populations (Pogge, 2002). Citizens, then, do not currently understand their state as 
an agent of cosmopolitan justice – rather, many explicitly conceive of their state as in 
competition with other states, and thus understand part of its purpose as the seeking of 
comparative advantage over those other states.  
As well as the ‘national interest’, citizens also often care about social justice. Indeed, 
an alternative (but compatible) understanding of the purpose of the state could be the 
establishment of just relationships between citizens. But then another problem seems 
potentially to be presented by the apparent conflict between a state’s pursuit of internal justice 
(i.e. structuring relationships between its citizens in a just manner) and the realisation of 
cosmopolitan justice. For example, if a well-off but unjustifiably internally unequal state’s 
government invests large sums of money in its more deprived regions in an effort to ease that 
internal inequality, it might, by that very act, be acting unjustly from a cosmopolitan 
perspective, since globally there are individuals suffering far worse forms of poverty than that 
suffered by its own citizens. On the other hand, a state government that instead spent that 
money relieving severe poverty overseas might also be committing an injustice by passing 
over social injustice at home, the alleviation of the latter being its purpose in existing.   
What follows from these considerations is that it is possible to argue that it would be 
illegitimate for state governments to seek to realise cosmopolitan principles, even if doing so 
is a demand of justice. We might then characterise the state as an inherently unjust institution 
from a cosmopolitan perspective, but it is precisely because of this fact that it represents an 
inappropriate agent of cosmopolitan justice: it just can’t take on the role the cosmopolitan 
wants to assign to it without betraying itself. Is a crime syndicate appropriately chargeable 
with duties to obey the law? Normatively speaking, yes it is. But in another sense, the 
assignment of this duty just doesn’t make sense given that the very reason that that corporate 
agent exists is to benefit by breaking the law. Expecting a crime syndicate not to break the 
law is in fact to expect the impossible – the only way it can comply is to cease being a crime 
syndicate. Similarly, on an understanding of states as inevitable servers of their own citizens’ 
interests, the only way that states could coherently aid the realisation of distributive 
cosmopolitanism would be by dissolving themselves. If the purpose of the state is 
alternatively, or also, the pursuit of domestic social justice, then the worry is that in 
prioritising global injustice, states may illegitimately overlook injustices at home that it is 
their purpose to alleviate.    
 
Statist cosmopolitanism  
Given the above, what basis is there to expect the state system to be a promising site for the 
realisation of cosmopolitan justice? The theory of statist cosmopolitanism offers an answer. 
For statist cosmopolitanism, the state represents the most plausible agent of cosmopolitan 
justice because, as an already established political community, it has various resources at its 
disposal that are absent at transnational and global levels and that can potentially be harnessed 
in service of cosmopolitan ends.  
Statist cosmopolitanism understands the state as comprising a cohesive historical 
community, featuring shared cultural reference points and ‘schemes of understanding’, to 
which its citizens are emotionally attached. In an echo of communitarian theorising, it is 
understood to be within this context that persons’ moral norms are learnt and that moral 
action is motivationally sustainable. But the statist cosmopolitan denies that this must 
necessarily mean that moral principles remain inwardly focussed and particularist. Indeed, the 
political community of the state is best understood as a ‘unique social entity in dynamic 
development’, rather than as a static entity with a rigid self-understanding and moral 
commitments (Ypi, 2008, p. 59). It is an entity that collaboratively builds upon its historical 
experiences and shared understandings to reach new interpretations of itself. On account of 
this pre-existing attachment, radical change is motivationally plausible, potentially in a 
cosmopolitan direction:  
 
Imperatives flowing from the new interpretations of the point and purpose of shared 
institutions would in this case not appear over-demanding and citizens would not comply 
simply out of fear of coercive mechanisms. They would do so as part of their allegiance to 
political institutions to whose development they have contributed (Ypi, 2011, p. 152).  
 
In other words, where a cosmopolitan transformation of a state occurs, it will be recognised as 
a collective reinterpretation of the purpose of the political community to which one is already 
emotionally attached, and will thus contain its own source of motivational stability. By 
contrast, those who recommend some form of political cosmopolitanism, rejecting domestic-
level affective attachments as straightforwardly anti-cosmopolitan, not only ignore political 
reality in a counterproductive manner (cf. Brown, 2011), but also overlook a potentially 
potent source of cosmopolitan motivation.  
By asserting the possibility of the internal self-reinterpretation of political 
community, statist cosmopolitanism raises the prospect of overcoming the critique of the state 
system outlined in the previous section. Perhaps, where the appropriate cosmopolitan self-
understandings are extant, an anarchical state system no longer presents the same difficulties, 
since states will not seek advantage at the expense of others and will not appeal to their 
sovereign status to avoid cosmopolitan obligations. Similarly, collective action problems look 
more readily solvable, since states will be less inclined to ‘free ride’ with respect to global 
public goods and will be actively willing to contribute their fair share to the realisation of 
distributive cosmopolitanism. Furthermore, since states will have collectively reinterpreted 
their purpose in a cosmopolitan direction, the self-understood purpose of the state will no 
longer be counter to cosmopolitan ends. Just as the members of a crime syndicate might 
collectively reject a life of crime and instead direct their energies toward community 
improvement projects, it might be possible that the citizens of a state come to democratically 
decide that they wish their association to devote itself to reducing global inequalities and 
improving the living standards of the globally worst-off – they might decide, that is, that their 
state should work for the collective benefit of all, and not simply the ‘national interest’.  
Furthermore, in a world in which all states were committed cosmopolitan agents, the 
worry that domestic justice need necessarily conflict with cosmopolitan justice seems to 
dissipate. Such states would commit to the establishment and maintenance of a just ‘global 
background context’, within which states’ domestic justice efforts would be unproblematic. 
Of course, ‘the resource reallocation that this egalitarian international order requires 
will...entail some reduction in the entitlements of some presently very well-off countries’, and 
some restriction on the right to self-determination; rich governments could not justify 
devoting resources to narrowing inequalities between individuals within their territories if the 
appropriate global background context was not in place (Tan, 2004, p. 122; see also Ronzoni, 
2009). But in a world of political communities that had undergone cosmopolitan 
transformations, these restrictions would presumably be accepted by ‘responsible 
cosmopolitan states’ (Brown, 2011).   
Why, however, should we expect that a political community might actually ever 
reorient itself toward cosmopolitan principles in this way? Isn’t it more reasonable to expect 
that particularist political communities will continue to deliver ethically particular outcomes?  
Statist cosmopolitanism’s proposed answer is to turn to the role activists can play in alerting 
citizens to global injustice, ‘challenging consent about the function and purpose of existing 
political institutions and…drawing attention to the need for a new interpretation of their role’ 
(Ypi, 2011, p. 169). The groups in question here are diverse, including large international 
non-governmental organisations, pressure groups, trade unions, religious groups, and 
amorphous, localised social movements. Rather than be phased by the mammoth task that 
these groups have ahead of them, statist cosmopolitanism draws an analogy with historically 
successful activist campaigns such as the abolitionist and women’s suffrage movements:  
 
Owing to the activity of political avant-gardes what initially appeared unacceptable to consolidated 
elites or was considered over-demanding by the larger mass of citizens progressively matured into 
a persistent popular request for modifying the scope and franchise of democratic citizenship. It is 
through the construction of similar political initiatives that other fellow-citizens came to 
progressively sympathise with the suffering of vulnerable subjects and that initially weak moral 
motives obtained political agency (Ypi, 2010, p. 123).  
 
The claim is that cosmopolitan activists today represent a ‘cosmopolitan avant-garde’ that can 
spark debate and ultimately stimulate a cosmopolitan reinterpretation of the purpose of the 
domestic state. This reinterpretation is to occur reiteratively within state communities, as 
activists within each state, as part of their agenda-setting and advocacy, translate 
cosmopolitan arguments into a form that appeals to the particular ‘shared schemes of 
understanding’ and cultural-historical reference points found there.  
 I want to subject the idea of statist cosmopolitanism to critique from two directions: 
the unlikelihood, as I see it, of the cosmopolitan avant-garde inspiring cosmopolitan 
transformations of states; and then, setting aside the first critique, the appropriateness of the 
domestic state system remaining in place even if the avant-garde are indeed successful.  
 
Can the cosmopolitan avant-garde succeed?  
 
Within statist cosmopolitan theory, the cosmopolitan avant-garde are hypothesised to be able 
to motivate the reiterative cosmopolitan transformation of states via the strength of 
cosmopolitan moral argument alone. No appeal is made, for example, to the potential efficacy 
of self-interested arguments for alleviating global poverty, or of developing affective ties and 
identities across borders. Accordingly, I restrict myself here to consideration of statist 
cosmopolitanism’s ‘Kantian’ approach, although I in any case believe that alternative 
potential sources of cosmopolitan motivation themselves necessitate extensive global political 
integration.4  
When are activist campaigns successful? Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink’s 
instructive study of transnational activist networks tells us that two factors are most potent: 
clear and direct physical harm to vulnerable people, ‘especially where there is a short and 
clear causal chain (or story) assigning responsibility’; and the fact of legal inequality (1998, p. 
26). Recall that the argument in support of the idea of the cosmopolitan avant-garde points to 
the historical precedents of the abolition of slavery and women’s suffrage. These two cases 
appear to conform to Keck and Sikkink’s analysis: in the case of slavery, there existed both 
direct physical harm and legal inequality; in the case of women’s suffrage the issue was one 
of clear legal inequality. The discrete campaigns often offered as examples of the 
cosmopolitan avant-garde in action – e.g. against the maltreatment of children and others 
working in sweatshops by multinational corporations, or pro-migration movements – also 
seem to fit into this framework. In the former case there exists a clearly responsible agent (the 
corporate employer) and a sense in which vulnerable people are being actively exploited (and 
arguably physically harmed). In the latter case there is again a clear legal inequality in 
evidence (between citizens of a state and the excluded).   
However, as we move beyond certain identifiable ‘bad things’ being visited upon 
some by others – slavery, child labour, political violence, the displacement of communities 
etc. – toward a thoroughgoing vision of global distributive justice, specific perpetrators of 
injustice become less easy to locate, and causal chains unavoidably become less clear. And 
when causal chains become less clear, alternative narratives become available. For example, 
in contrast to those who rally against the perceived unfairness of various international 
organisations and trade agreements and the purported effect these have on the inhabitants of 
less powerful countries, it can be – and is – claimed that in fact, global trade agreements have 
done much to improve the quality of life of many individuals worldwide (Bhagwati, 2004; 
Wolf, 2005). Where people remain in poverty, this might then be attributable to other factors: 
perhaps the problem is corrupt political elites in poor countries. Maybe poor countries, 
through political mismanagement and/or a certain socio-political public culture, are 
collectively responsible for their own plight. After all, there was a time at which the standards 
of living in, for example, Malaysia and Singapore were comparable, but (so one might argue) 
through judicious management, the latter has prospered whilst the former has not.5 This may 
present a compelling counter-narrative for individuals in richer countries who will not be keen 
to have the blame for global poverty laid at their own door if there is a seemingly viable 
alternative position to endorse.  
Keck and Sikkink themselves provide a relevant example of the difficulty faced by 
activists when causal chains are not obviously observable, stating that  
 
Activists have been able to convince people that the World Bank bears responsibility for the 
human and environmental impact of projects it directly funds, but have had a harder time 
convincingly making the IMF responsible for hunger or food riots in the developing world. In the 
latter case the causal chain is longer, more complex, and much less visible (1998, p. 28).  
 
To be entirely clear, it is not my claim that the truth of the matter regarding the empirical 
bases of global poverty cannot ultimately be determined. My point is that the complex nature 
of the situation allows space for alternative narratives to be developed that compete for our 
attention and are often successful in doing so, even when they are ultimately inaccurate. This 
is especially so given that some cosmopolitan narratives might be somewhat unpalatable to 
those to whom they are addressed. For example, one branch of cosmopolitan theorising holds 
all citizens of richer nations responsible for the currently existing global political system, a 
system that is said to cause global poverty and inequality (Pogge, 2002). It has been argued 
that the explication of this causal link should in itself motivate those implicated to remedy the 
problem (e.g. Dobson, 2006), but in fact, as Iris Young points out, ‘frequently the reaction of 
people being blamed for a wrong is defensive – to look for other agents who should be 
blamed instead of them, or to find excuses that mitigate their liability in those cases where 
they must agree that their actions do causally contribute to the harm’ (2004, p. 318). 
It’s also worth noting that Keck and Sikkink’s findings make grim reading for non-
relational cosmopolitan theory, i.e. theory that arrives at cosmopolitan principles without 
making reference to a causal or relational link between rich and poor at all. Global luck 
egalitarianism, for example, has very little fodder to offer the cosmopolitan avant-garde, 
grounded as it is upon arbitrariness rather than causation. Similarly, an appeal to shared 
humanity as a reason for including all in the scope of distributive justice (e.g. Caney, 2011) 
might, even if philosophically convincing, fall flat in practice as appeal to the ‘grandest but 
flimsiest of contemporary imagined communities’ (Canovan, 2001: 212). 
Whilst the ‘visibility’ of causal chains presents a difficulty for the avant-garde, it’s 
also the case that the state system itself constitutes a counteracting force that reaffirms 
particularistic sentiments and related moral beliefs. The job of those wishing to convince us of 
cosmopolitan principles is to win the argument against alternative attitudes and beliefs 
(whether those alternatives be clearly theoretically articulated or not); most obviously, 
cosmopolitan activists must overcome ‘associationist’ arguments that are articulated by 
nationalist and statist theorists and which accord with the beliefs of the majority of 
individuals in richer states today. But in this battle of the arguments cosmopolitans are at a 
distinct disadvantage. The ‘strength of the better argument’ might not always win out – a lot 
depends on the circumstances in which the argument is being made. Even if we suppose that 
associationist arguments are ultimately wrong, it’s clear that the associationist point of view 
enjoys high levels of support. This is because – contrary to cosmopolitanism – the thrust of an 
associationist point of view does not have to be actively presented to individuals (by activists 
or whoever) for their consideration: it is already internalised by individuals just in virtue of 
their everyday lived experience as members of different nations, and/or as citizens of different 
states. Indeed, nationalist theorist David Miller explicitly articulates a methodology that 
begins from the facts of actually existing sentiments and beliefs and thereafter attempts to 
construct a theory that incorporates those attitudes; this methodology is contrasted with an 
alternative that pays no heed to ‘what the people think’ and as such is liable to be viewed 
negatively as a philosopher’s ‘external imposition’ (1999a, p. 51). When it comes to global 
justice, one thing people currently tend to believe is that nations are of moral relevance. It is 
thus not difficult to understand that cosmopolitan theory will often be viewed as this type of 
external imposition. As Miller characterises it, the theory of nationalism is not exogenously 
presented to individuals for their consideration; rather, the sociological reality of nationalism 
informs nationalist theorising. That sociological reality, so many cosmopolitans contend, is a 
state construction (e.g. Appiah, 1996, p. 27; Axelsen, 2013; Weinstock, 2001).    
Statist theorising, while not proceeding via direct reference to what the people already 
think, does similarly forward arguments that are readily internalised – in their broad thrust at 
least – by individuals without any need for exogenous and explicit presentation of the 
argument. Members of a state are made keenly aware, every day, of their relationship to their 
state: they are aware of their status as citizens and of the benefits and burdens that status 
brings, and these features of their lives will often seem morally relevant to the scope of justice 
even if they are not (as non-relational cosmopolitans argue) or are no longer decisive due to 
other global institutional change (as relational cosmopolitans argue). Every day, their 
politicians, their media and their fellow citizens subtly reinforce (deliberately or otherwise) a 
‘banal nationalism’ that clarifies their existence as a member of a particular state (Billig, 
1995). The artificially-constructed separation from other individuals worldwide ‘naturally 
promotes a bias toward tending to the needs or interests of the citizen set, a bias that is 
reinforced by mostly inward-looking systems of national public education’ (Cabrera, 2004, p. 
81). The results of this socialisation are evidenced in, for example, objections voiced in public 
debates toward overseas aid. If these objections are not informed simply by nationalist 
sentiment, then they are often framed by appeal to the normative import of the state: we all 
pay taxes and participate in the same institutional scheme, foreigners don’t, so why should 
our money be sent there rather than spent on problems at home?6 These sorts of intuitive, 
reflex reactions to the idea of global distributive justice implicitly hit upon issues such as 
reciprocity, co-authorship and institutional coercion that are articulated explicitly by statist 
theorists (see, respectively, Sangiovanni, 2007; Nagel, 2005; Blake, 2001). 
In contrast to associationist arguments, cosmopolitan arguments often have to be 
explicitly presented to people in order that they be internalised. For example, complex causal 
arguments that appeal to unseen and unfelt (by the globally better-off, at least) global 
processes do need to be actively presented to us – and it is this presentation that is attempted 
by the cosmopolitan avant-garde. But these cosmopolitan arguments will be at the forefront of 
an individual’s consciousness only during the time at which the argument is being presented 
to them (if it is presented at all). Associationist arguments are arrived at autonomously and 
are felt and lived rather than learnt (although they are also learnt via a process of civic 
education). What’s more, they are felt and lived constantly. These felt and lived attitudes will, 
for most of us, overcome the ‘external imposition’ that is irregularly and fleetingly presented 
by cosmopolitan activists.  
Statist cosmopolitanism claims that the state needn’t necessarily have the effect of 
generating and replicating particularist intuitions; instead, the state might be harnessed for 
cosmopolitan ends because our attachment to our state as a community enables a radical 
reinterpretation of its purpose. But while it is no doubt true that this attachment would be a 
potent force if the state came to reinterpret itself in a cosmopolitan direction, my point is that 
state processes themselves – deliberate or otherwise – seem to stand in the way of that 
reinterpretation being successfully executed in the first place. None of what I have said here 
definitively refutes the possibility of avant-garde success. Yet success does seem unlikely, 
and importantly the main reason for this is the state system itself. This suggests that if 
cosmopolitan principles are to be widely internalised, there will need to be ‘top down’ global 
institutional change as well as ‘bottom up’ social movements (Ulaş, 2015).  
 
The consequences of avant-garde success  
Notwithstanding my argument above, it is my contention that avant-garde success would in 
any case lead to an eventual commitment to the transcendence of the domestic state system 
and integration within a federal world state order. To begin to show this I want to return to the 
idea of the purpose of the state. Suppose that the cosmopolitan avant-garde, over a number of 
years, score successes globally such that domestic states progressively come to understand 
their purpose to include fulfilling the demands of cosmopolitan justice between them; they 
would understand themselves to have the collective duty to realise and sustain a ‘just global 
background context’ that, in their view, amounted to global egalitarianism (Tan, 2004). We 
can assume in this regard that fair terms of economic integration would be adhered to in 
international institutions and that exploitation would be avoided. States would cease treating 
each other as competitors over whom they sought to gain advantage.  
Even if a cosmopolitan transformation in attitudes and behaviour does occur, 
however, it is unlikely that a system of multiple states would represent an efficient 
institutional site for a just global background context of this kind. This is because there 
would, regardless of states’ good intentions, remain various factors that would tend to push 
the world toward increasing inter-state inequality in a way that would over time translate into 
normatively troubling individual inequality:7 states will still possess differing levels of natural 
resources that can be utilised or sold for profit;8 some states will still find it easier to attract 
businesses than others, perhaps because they represent a strategically useful location or 
hospitable climate; states will still be vulnerable to the unpredictable nature of global markets, 
and will still be indirectly affected by the economic decisions of other states (for example, if 
one state decides to produce more products of its own rather than import from elsewhere, or 
to cut business taxes, this may have a knock-on effect on other states which harms their 
ability to fulfil their own duties); the larger population of some states will still provide a 
bigger tax base that allows for the undertaking of various projects unavailable to states with 
smaller populations; states with larger market sizes will still tend toward growth more 
quickly; agrarian states still might suffer a number of particularly bad years’ harvest on 
account of natural disasters. And so on.  
The statist cosmopolitan might accept all this, and claim that none of it is 
problematic; we need not expect that states offering each other fair terms of cooperation, 
committing to avoid exploitation and so forth will in itself realise a just global order in a 
stable and on-going manner. All that follows is that states have additional duties to produce 
this order – and since we are assuming that states have undergone their respective 
cosmopolitan transformations, they will be willing to take on that task. It’s not clear, 
however, that separate states will be both willing and able to do so. For one thing, the global 
economy is in significant part out of states’ control: 
 
Unless states can effectively control significant aspects of the world economy – such as price, 
exchange rates (the strength of each currency), capital flows and investment, which sectors of 
the economy get developed, speed of development, property ownership regimes, and 
employment patterns – they will not be able to continuously adjust for the consequences of 
global horizontal impact [i.e. the way accumulated trade transactions, agreements etc. affect 
global distribution] (Meckled-Garcia, 2008, p. 265).9  
 
Without these pervasive controls, any attempts made by states to sustain a just global 
background context will have unpredictable and imprecise results: it is not credible to believe 
that states could possess the epistemological capacity to foresee the indirect and complex 
results of market interactions and decisions and alter their own behaviour accordingly, not 
least because other states’ attempts to do exactly the same thing would need to be factored 
into any calculation. Within domestic states, either these problems do not apply, or 
governments do have the appropriate control, or in any case they have ‘direct redistributive 
control on an on-going basis through the distribution of rights and duties’ (Meckled-Garcia, 
2008, p. 267). Of course, no currently existing agent has these powers at the global level. But, 
given that we are assuming the motivation exists within each domestic state to realise and 
maintain distributive cosmopolitanism, the rational thing to do would then seem to be for 
those states to create the missing centralised agency, thereby unburdening themselves from 
these difficulties.10 If motivated, states can effectively control, for example, exchange rates: 
they can do so by rejecting a system of separate currencies altogether and developing one 
global currency complete with the necessary accompanying institutions. After all, in a world 
in which cosmopolitanism has been universally internalised, what positive role do separate 
currencies and exchange rates play? Why would they be viewed as anything other than an 
inconvenience that tends towards economic turbulence and inequality (Frankman, 2002)? 
 An alternative of ongoing transfers of money from richer countries to poorer ones is 
at best an inefficient way to proceed. A common worry of those opposed to the practice of 
giving ‘aid’ is that it can foster dependency in the recipient states. Others worry that 
movements of money into an economy over prolonged periods can ‘cause inflation and its 
associated problems’ (Meckled-Garcia, 2008, p. 265). I cannot hope to comment on whether 
these technical difficulties are surmountable or not. But even if they are surmountable, they 
present complex and unnecessary challenges. What would be the point of this indirect method 
of achieving the desired outcome? Why retain separate economies and continually struggle to 
reset the inequalities that inevitably arise between individuals globally via a voluntary 
transference of money between states, rather than develop an administrative system that has a 
more direct control over the welfare levels of individuals worldwide via its own social and 
economic policies?  
 More problematically, however, one can object that the supposed solution of ongoing 
redistributions of funds from some states to others in other to sustain a fully just global order 
in fact achieves no such thing: to believe that it would is to ignore the dynamic of power and 
dependency that remains in play in such a scenario, and that is problematic from the 
perspective of justice regardless of whether or not that power advantage actually manifests as 
a material advantage (Forst, 2012; Ronzoni, 2009). This power difference by definition 
cannot be overcome by anything that the more powerful states decide voluntarily to do (or not 
do). It can only be overcome by way of the development of formal legal-political institutions 
at the global level that have direct redistributive control and that fundamentally and 
effectively rebalance that power difference at its root.  
 Consider further that we have so far assumed that domestic states and their citizens 
will always at least be trying to fulfil their cosmopolitan duties after the hypothetical 
cosmopolitan transformation has occurred. But is this in fact a reasonable assumption? 
Consider the domestic context. It would absurdly optimistic to expect the majority of 
individuals to voluntarily and consistently adhere to the moral precepts that they recognise 
intellectually; what Aristotle called akratic action, and which is often today called ‘weakness 
of will’ or ‘backsliding’, is a recognised feature of human experience. The coercive power of 
the state helps here: we don’t have a choice, day-to-day, over whether or not we contribute to 
a redistributive welfare system, which means we cannot easily ‘free ride’, backslide or 
otherwise renege on our responsibilities even if in moments of moral weakness we want to. It 
is for this reason that Kurt Bayertz calls the modern welfare state an example of ‘quasi-
solidarity’ (1999: 24). It does not require our active participation; nor does it allow us the 
opportunity to fail to live up to its requirements. Cosmopolitans who reject the notion of 
centralised coercive force at the global level implausibly expect a more demanding variety of 
political solidarity to hold at the global level than has been achieved in the domestic context.  
 Recognising the ongoing difficulties presented by the domestic state system, the 
population of a hypothetical future world which had been convinced of the merits of 
cosmopolitan distributive justice should be expected to ask itself: what good are separate 
states? Should they be abandoned? The statist cosmopolitan might reply that they shouldn’t, 
because states are not only potential agents of cosmopolitan justice – they are also 
communities to which people remain attached, even after a cosmopolitan reinterpretation of 
that community has occurred. Indeed, recall that it is this attachment to the state as a 
community that is hypothesised to offer a solution to the problem of cosmopolitan motivation 
in the first place. However, a federal world state would potentially be able to preserve 
precisely those elements of a domestic state that are claimed by the statist cosmopolitan to be 
motivationally efficacious, and would entail no further curtailment of domestic state powers 
than is in any case demanded by cosmopolitan moral theory itself.  
One way of characterising what has happened when states have effected a 
cosmopolitan transformation is to say that they have rejected the notion of the economic self-
determination of states, i.e. the idea that if one state becomes richer or poorer than another, it 
is the responsibility of the respective states alone, and the inequality that arises demands no 
redress (cf. Rawls, 1999; Miller 1999b). Yet we can also point to two other main facets of 
self-determination, which I will term political and cultural self-determination. Political self-
determination means the ability of a polity to structure internal relations between individuals 
in the public sphere as it sees fit, as well as the ability to follow any collective goals or 
purposes the community may have without outside interference or hindrance (to the extent 
that those purposes do not interfere with the self-determination of others). Political self-
determination in fact encompasses many economic decisions: how a political community uses 
its own resources in a cosmopolitan world is a matter of its own political self-determination. 
Cultural self-determination refers to the ability of a given polity to live according to its 
particular public culture(s) without external suppression, and may also involve certain 
protectionist policies to that end.  
It is the political and cultural aspects of the state which the statist cosmopolitan 
foresees being harnessed by the avant-garde in the pursuit of cosmopolitan transformations. 
And a federal global order could preserve for federal units (formerly states) some control over 
these elements. For example, a sensibly constructed global federal state would allow domestic 
units to retain fully autonomous decision-making capability with respect to localised issues 
which affected only the residents of that unit (in accordance with a principle of subsidiarity). 
It could not be the case, of course, that these units retain autonomous decision-making power 
with respect to actions the effects of which extended beyond the borders of that unit, not least 
because allowing such a right would infringe upon the self-determination of other units, as 
global democracy theorists have made clear (e.g. Held, 1995). Nor can it be the case that sub-
global political units’ right to political self-determination be categorical: in order to be 
justified from a cosmopolitan perspective, that right to self-determination must go hand-in-
hand with a commitment to realising a just global order. But cosmopolitans, even statist 
cosmopolitans, must be committed to these restrictions upon political autonomy; a federal 
world order therefore need not place any further restriction upon political self-determination 
than cosmopolitan moral theory itself demands – it merely formalises this restriction.  
With respect to cultural self-determination, a federal state structure could leave 
decisions regarding official first languages, school curricula, public holidays, and so on in the 
hands of domestic units. Again, there would of course be a limit to the extent to which a 
cosmopolitan federal world state would be willing to respect cultural autonomy: clearly, for 
example, illiberal and hierarchical ‘public cultures’ could not be tolerated. But again, such 
cultures are in any case not tolerated by cosmopolitan moral theory itself. Indeed, statist 
cosmopolitanism must already assume that all domestic states will be transformed by the 
cosmopolitan avant-garde into liberal egalitarian domestic states, if the theory is to make 
sense as a potential route to the realisation of cosmopolitan principles. So as with political 
self-determination, the restrictions placed on cultural self-determination by a federal world 
order could be understood as legally formalising what is in any case already required by 
cosmopolitan moral theory. 
  
What are the avant-garde really doing? 
Statist cosmopolitanism characterises the cosmopolitan avant-garde as arguing for the 
transformation of domestic states via the invocation of a shared historical background and 
conceptual categories present in the public culture of any one state; those resources are then 
‘placed at the service of moral learning’. But the avant-garde are just as easily, if not better 
characterised as a force urging the development of a new global community, and agitating for 
the transcendence of the domestic state system.  
Many of the most plausible candidates for membership of the cosmopolitan avant-
garde do not obviously refer back to state-level shared understandings in order to put their 
points across. Take, for example, the Occupy movement (of American origin) and its frequent 
rhetorical references to, for example, ‘our brothers and sisters in Cairo’, or the following from 
a ‘Manifesto for Global Democracy’:  
Inspired by our sisters and brothers in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Bahrain, New York, 
Palestine-Israel, Spain and Greece, we too call for a regime change: a global regime change…. 
Today, like the Mexican Zapatistas, we say “¡Ya basta! Aquí el pueblo manda y el gobierno 
obedece”: Enough! Here the people command and global institutions obey! Like the Spanish 
Tomalaplaza we say “Democracia Real Ya”: True global democracy now! Today we call the 
citizens of the world: let us globalise Tahrir Square! Let us globalise Puerta del Sol!  
(quoted in Suarez and Zameret, 2011)  
 
The aim seems to be precisely to speak to all individuals worldwide at once, and to 
characterise all as part of the same community (the same demos) at a global level. The 
quotation above also provides clear evidence that many of the cosmopolitan avant-garde are 
explicitly agitating for the creation of new global political institutions, and not just the 
transformation of currently existing states. With this in mind we can contrast statist 
cosmopolitanism’s characterisation of the avant-garde with an alternative approach in which 
avant-garde activists are understood to be practising ‘institutional global citizenship’, where 
this involves advocating the overcoming of the domestic state system and the promotion of 
global political integration (Cabrera, 2010). This conceptualisation of the work of 
cosmopolitan activists often fits the reality more accurately.  
Characterising the avant-garde as pursuing a strategy of global community 
development and usurpation of the domestic state system also aids one in confronting the 
reality that not all societies’ shared understandings and wider cultural resources currently 
contain the sorts of ideas that will in fact aid a cosmopolitan transformation. Not all states are 
liberal-democratic; some are distinctly hierarchical. In the latter type of state, it is the case 
that one of the apparently ‘shared understandings’ within the public political culture is the 
inequality of individuals. In these cases, what the avant-garde must do first is weaken and 
ultimately overcome these traditional shared understanding and replace them with egalitarian 
understandings. This is not to say that activists cannot work to overcome hierarchical 
understandings without entirely pulling apart a given community that purportedly subscribes 
to them; but it is to say that much of the activists’ work will necessarily be somewhat 
homogenising in form, narrowing the extent of value diversity in the world, indeed turning 
the entire global population into liberal egalitarians, and as such may well be said to be aimed 
at the beginnings of a construction of a new cohesive global community with globally shared 
values, instead of merely the transformation of old communities. 
By contrast, understanding the cosmopolitan avant-garde simply as reiterative moral 
persuaders faces another problem. On the statist cosmopolitan account, separate political 
communities are supposed to reorient themselves toward the realisation of cosmopolitan 
principles on account of being progressively convinced of the latter’s appropriateness. Yet it 
is often argued that the motivation to realise norms of justice doesn’t arise just from being 
morally persuaded of things, but also from a fund of ‘fellow feeling’ that pertains between 
members of a community. This, of course, is precisely the position of liberal nationalist 
theorists: the nation as a community is said to be of instrumental importance in realising 
solidaristic outcomes (e.g. Canovan, 1996; Miller, 1995; Tamir, 1993). In retaining the idea of 
separate political communities to which people are variously attached, statist 
cosmopolitanism retains the idea that individuals will still feel primary emotional attachment 
to their own community ahead of others. But if this is the case, and if some of our moral 
motivation comes not from the acceptance of moral argument but simply from emotional 
attachment to our community, then there is a clear limit to what the cosmopolitan avant-garde 
can do. They cannot engender a full, motivationally plausible cosmopolitan reinterpretation of 
the community because to do so would necessitate forging new global emotional attachments, 
which would involve the transcendence of particular political communities rather than merely 
their reinterpretation.  
 
Conclusion  
In conclusion, I want to emphasise the separability of two elements of statist 
cosmopolitanism: the cosmopolitan avant-garde and the institutional vision. The former refers 
to the notion of activists effecting cosmopolitan change in and across states. The latter refers 
to the vision that cosmopolitan justice be realised whilst the multi-state system remains in 
place in an ongoing sense. Statist cosmopolitanism, as it has been articulated thus far in the 
literature, seems to me to run both elements together. But it’s important to note that one could 
appeal to the cosmopolitan avant-garde as a route to a cosmopolitan future without endorsing 
the institutional vision; that is, one could recognise that today’s activists might herald a 
coming cosmopolitan future without subscribing to the idea that states – and the communities 
they contain – will or should continue to exist in the same way once those activists have 
begun to be successful.11 
 I have sounded a note of strong scepticism regarding the possibilities of success for 
the avant-garde given the assumption of the continued existence of the state system – my 
main point was that the state system itself acts as a formidable countervailing force for the 
avant-garde to overcome, which appears to be another reason to consider the state system part 
of the problem rather than the solution. This leads to the thought that ‘top down’ institutional 
integration at the global level will have to come before, or alongside, the rise of ‘bottom up’ 
social movements. Such a thought brings its own concerns, such as how and why global 
political integration might ever occur in advance of the presence of widespread cosmopolitan 
sensibilities, and whether such change could occur in morally unproblematic ways.    
  Even if my scepticism about the powers of the avant-garde proves to be unfounded, 
however, it doesn’t follow that statist cosmopolitanism is right about the institutional vision. 
Indeed, if the avant-garde succeed in bringing us all around to cosmopolitan moral principles, 
I have argued that the eventual construction of a global federal order appears to be the likely 
consequence. This is especially so given the alternative characterisation of the reality of the 
avant-garde I offered, in which they are understood as seeking the development of a new 
global community and the transcendence of the domestic state system.  
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1. I here understand cosmopolitan justice to be met when the relevant ‘distribuenda’ are distributed 
amongst individuals globally in a broadly egalitarian manner. I understand distribuenda widely, to 
 
potentially encompass, for example, resources, welfare, opportunities, as well as inherently relational 
concepts like power and recognition. I defend neither a particular conception of cosmopolitan justice 
nor cosmopolitanism more generally – the latter is simply taken as axiomatic for the purposes of this 
paper.  
2. This paper responds primarily to Lea Ypi’s recent thought; indeed, the phrase ‘statist 
cosmopolitanism’ is hers (2008; 2011). Ypi presents the most fully worked-out positive argument for 
the domestic state system as a setting for the realisation of distributive cosmopolitanism. However, 
much of my argument here applies to any theory that wishes to appeal to the potential cosmopolitan 
transformation of domestic states. For instance, Ypi’s argument has similarities with Seyla Benhabib’s 
(2006) notion of ‘democratic iteration’, as well as Patti Lenard’s (2012) reference to the expansionary 
egalitarian potential of democratic states. Kok-Chor Tan expresses the belief that nation-states can 
become good cosmopolitan citizens in his Justice Without Borders (2004). For a general appeal for 
‘bringing the state back in’ to cosmopolitan theorising, see Garrett Wallace Brown (2011).  
3. While this last addition is less obviously a global public good, there is reason to think that, for 
example, instability in poor countries threatens richer states’ own stability. See Daniel Weinstock 
(2010).  
4. See, for example, Ulaş (2015).  
5. For this type of argument see Miller (2007). 
6. I do not mean to suggest that either nationalist or statist theorists actually object to foreign aid. 
Indeed, both tend to believe that there are obligations of justice to relieve severe poverty abroad. My 
point is that the broad thrust of these positions – i.e. the moral relevance of the nation and/or the state 
to global justice – are internalised autonomously, simply in virtue of living within the nation-state 
system. This is true even if the nuanced specifics of those philosophical positions are not grasped in the 
same way.  
7. Given the reality of differing state sizes, global individual equality necessarily entails interstate 
inequality, but that does not mean that all forms of interstate inequality translate to individual equality. 
My thought here is that we will see inter-state inequalities arise in a pattern that is not compatible with 
individual equality.  
8. It is true that natural resources are often said to be a ‘curse’, as countries that depend on the export of 
natural resources often have authoritarian governments, are plagued by civil war, suffer low levels of 
growth and high levels of inequality and poverty. But as Leif Wenar (2008) points out, the ‘curse’ is a 
symptom of the international rules that allocate control over those resources. In a world of 
cosmopolitan states, we can assume that these defective rules would be corrected such that it was not 
possible, for example, for dictators to plunder a country’s resources for their own personal benefit.  
9. Meckled-Garcia believes that the absence of a currently existing agent capable of competently and 
authoritatively acting upon a given distributive principle precludes that principle from being the right 
one. Cosmopolitans, however, do not accept such an ‘agency based’ approach to justice. For critique of 
such an approach, see Valentini (2011: 100-107).  
10. If it is relational cosmopolitanism that has been internalised, then an alternative might be a mutual 
commitment amongst states to cease interacting with each other (although it seems rather unlikely that 
this is possible).  
11. For a similar suggestion see Rahul Rao (2013: 103). I go further than Rao in suggesting more 
strongly that the success of the cosmopolitan avant-garde not only could but, in all likelihood, does 
entail the transcendence of the domestic state system. While in her 2008 article and in Global Justice 
and Avant-Garde Political Agency Lea Ypi makes no mention of alternative institutional proposals, in 
another more recent article (2013) she makes an explicit appeal to the need for ‘political 
cosmopolitanism’, referencing favourably recent work on global democracy. Here, the political vision 
of statist cosmopolitanism is more or less explicitly rejected, and Ypi highlights many of the same 
problems with the idea of realising global justice through state ‘voluntarism’ that I referenced in 
Section 1 of this paper. However, the apparent conflict between the two cosmopolitan institutional 
visions is not explicitly reconciled.  
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